Biden Weighing ‘Draconian’ Steps Against Israel Was Derailed by Iran Attack, Top Adviser Says
President Joe Biden came close to taking extraordinary punitive action against Israel after an Israeli military drone strike killed seven World Central Kitchen aid workers in Gaza in April 2024. But, according to Brett McGurk, a longtime Middle East adviser to four American presidents, the only thing that stopped him was U.S. intelligence that Iran was about to launch an unprecedented aerial attack on Israel.
McGurk, who served as White House National Security Council coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa, disclosed the episode in an interview with “Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan” taped Thursday. He described a furious and increasingly frustrated Biden who was “fed up” with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s conduct of the war in Gaza.
“At that moment, if not for that impending missile attack, which we then had to deploy military forces … I think we would have taken some pretty draconian measures against Israel,” McGurk said. He added that cutting off U.S. weapons to Israel “was very much on the table.”
The revelation arrives with the publication of McGurk’s new memoir, “Brink,” set to be released Tuesday. In the book and in his television interview, McGurk offers a behind-the-scenes account of the Biden administration’s handling of the Middle East during one of the most volatile periods in modern history. That period encompasses the Hamas terror attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023; Israel’s military campaign in Gaza; the effort to free hostages; the threat of a wider regional war; and the unresolved question of normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
McGurk is no longer part of the Biden national security circle and currently works as a CNN contributor.
A Tense Conversation Between Biden and Netanyahu
According to McGurk, the confrontation between Washington and Jerusalem reached a critical point just ahead of Iran’s massive retaliatory strike against Israel. Days earlier, an Israeli drone strike had killed seven aid workers with World Central Kitchen, including international staff members. The deaths caused international outrage and put intense domestic and global pressure on Biden to respond forcefully to Israel.
McGurk recalled a tense conversation between Biden and Netanyahu around that time in which the American leader warned the prime minister that he could end the weapons supply. The Israeli government at the time said it believed there were more than 130 hostages held in Gaza and reported around 34,000 Palestinian deaths, according to the Hamas-run Gaza Ministry of Health.
The exchange, as McGurk recounts it, included a startling line from Biden: “You think I’m Santa Claus? No Santa in Israel, pal.”
The threat to withhold weapons never fully materialized in the way McGurk said Biden envisioned, primarily because of what happened next. U.S. intelligence detected that Iran was preparing a large-scale assault on Israel. The attack, when it came, included an estimated 120 ballistic missiles, 170 drones, and 30 cruise missiles, all apparently timed to arrive at the same time. The United States, along with Arab and European partners, helped Israel intercept the barrage.
McGurk’s account suggests that Biden’s instinct was to make an example of Israel over the killings of the aid workers, but the broader regional threat forced a recalculation. The administration instead focused on defending Israel and attempting to prevent a full-scale regional conflagration.
Weapons, Leverage, and the Debate Over U.S. Support
Biden’s handling of the Israel-Hamas war has long been a source of internal and external criticism. During the 2024 presidential campaign, the administration faced intense pressure from members of his own party to cut off military aid to Israel as the humanitarian situation in Gaza deteriorated.
The United States is the largest weapons supplier to Israel and provides billions of dollars in military assistance. A State Department review of Israel’s conduct found it was “reasonable to assess” that Israeli security forces had used U.S.-made weapons in ways “inconsistent with” international humanitarian law obligations. The review also said that the level of civilian casualties in Gaza raised “substantial questions” about whether the Israel Defense Forces were using American-supplied weapons effectively in all cases.
Democratic Sen. Chris Van Hollen told “Face the Nation” in November 2024 that Biden had failed to use U.S. leverage effectively. Van Hollen argued that the administration sent Israel “more bombs and more money” even after Netanyahu disregarded Biden’s requests, and he pointed to U.S. laws that block arms shipments to military units that commit human rights violations.
McGurk acknowledged that the Biden administration did pause some weapons transfers to Israel, including shipments of 2,000-pound bombs. But it never instituted a complete halt. McGurk said he believes that some of the calls to go much further may not have produced the results their advocates expected.
“Israel also has one of the largest arms industries in the world, so the idea that had Biden gone further on a step on that course, it would have stopped the war, I just think the record does not support that,” McGurk said.
He also argued that applying too much public pressure on Israel could have hardened Hamas’s position and set back negotiations to end the war and release hostages. “I come back to the question: How do you end this crisis?” he said. “And I think the record shows: If you just stop American support for Israel, that is not going to end the crisis, it’s going to make it worse.”
At the same time, attacks on U.S. forces by Iranian-backed proxy groups had surged. McGurk said he pushed Biden to punish Iran in an effort to deter those attacks, and he expressed frustration with colleagues in the administration who were wary of striking Iranian officials in response.
The Nuclear Question and Fordow
One of the more consequential revelations in McGurk’s account involves Iran’s nuclear program. In December 2024, McGurk traveled to Israel with national security adviser Jake Sullivan as they worked to reach a deal with Hamas on releasing the remaining Israeli hostages. During that visit, Netanyahu talked about taking out nuclear sites in Iran, including Fordow, a facility built inside a mountain that processed and stored highly enriched uranium.
Fordow later became one of three Iranian nuclear sites that President Trump ordered to be bombed in June 2025, eight months before the Trump administration and Israeli forces launched a wider war against Iran.
McGurk said the Biden administration was concerned in late 2024 that Iran “might make a dash” toward producing weapons-grade uranium. Officials were open to carrying out strikes if they obtained evidence showing Iran was building a bomb. Netanyahu, however, urged the United States not to wait for that step, according to McGurk.
Iran had been building up a stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent, which is considered just a short step from the material needed to build a weapon.
“We actually had a principals committee meeting — that’s everybody around the table — what would we do if we see that?” McGurk said. “And as I recall, unanimity on: We would do the strike in Fordow. We didn’t see that. We sent a message to Iran, don’t even think about it. But yet Netanyahu was clearly contemplating that.”
The Ceasefire and the Hostage Releases
Hamas and Israel struck a ceasefire deal that led to the release of some hostages just days before President Trump took office and the Biden national security team left the White House. McGurk said he and Trump’s Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff “agreed we’re going to work in lockstep” and described how both teams applied pressure on Hamas and Israel.
Hamas eventually released the last living hostages in October 2025, as part of another ceasefire agreement. The negotiations were a long and painful saga, with families of hostages pressing both governments for action, and McGurk’s book is said to offer new detail about how close various moments came to collapse.
The Oct. 7 Warnings and a “Failure of Imagination”
In recent weeks, renewed attention has been paid to the circumstances leading up to the Oct. 7 attack. Reports from The New York Times, The Atlantic, and the Israeli newspaper Haaretz have detailed warnings that officials in Egypt and the United Arab Emirates allegedly delivered to Israel that Hamas was planning a major operation. Netanyahu has strongly denied that he received any such warnings, but his political opponents in Israel’s election later this month have expressed outrage.
CBS News has confirmed via a former U.S. official and a diplomatic source that Emirati Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan, President of the UAE, shared a warning with Netanyahu in the weeks leading up to the attack. The UAE had learned that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was preparing a major attack, though it did not have specific intelligence such as a date, time, or location.
McGurk told CBS News the United States had no comparable intelligence. “We did not have anything in our system that would have been a warning and indicator,” he said. “No U.S. intelligence of a warning or indicator.”
He added that Israel should launch an official inquiry into its own security establishment and political leadership, much like the United States did after the 9/11 attacks. “I think they had an assumption that was deeply ingrained that Hamas was deterred, assuaged, and was not about to do something massive on any scale like this,” he said. “I think that was a false assumption in their system, a failure of imagination, and it was tragic.”
The Road to Saudi-Israeli Normalization and the Fist Bump
Hours before the Oct. 7, 2023 attack, McGurk said he met with Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to the U.S., Princess Reema Bandar, to discuss a different issue — a potential pathway for Israel and Saudi Arabia to normalize relations. Just weeks earlier, Netanyahu had stood at the UN General Assembly in New York and predicted a new Middle East that would include normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Islam. “I believe that we are at the cusp of an even more dramatic breakthrough: an historic peace with Saudi Arabia,” Netanyahu said.
According to McGurk, the idea of Saudi Arabia establishing formal diplomatic ties with Israel had first been floated to him by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in January 2021, shortly after Biden took office. The potential deal would have included a pathway to a Palestinian peace agreement. McGurk said he reported the offer to Biden, but the administration did not act on it.
Biden was deeply skeptical of Saudi Arabia, having vowed during the 2020 Democratic primaries to treat the kingdom as a “pariah” because of U.S. intelligence indicating that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was linked to the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi. McGurk also said Biden did not want to focus on the Middle East. The administration only reached out to the Gulf states after the chaotic U.S. exit from Afghanistan in August 2021, when it needed those governments to take in Afghan allies fleeing the Taliban. The United States again needed a favor in 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, and turned to the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, to pump more oil and alleviate rising prices.
McGurk called it a “mistake” that administration officials had not engaged with Saudi Arabia more frequently early in Biden’s term. He convinced Biden to visit in 2022.
That trip produced one of the most memorable images of Biden’s presidency. Rather than shaking hands with the crown prince, Biden gave him a fist bump. McGurk offered rare public criticism of Biden over that moment. He recounted that for 18 minutes, Air Force One sat on the tarmac in the Kingdom while Biden argued with aides over how he would greet the crown prince at his palace. “He was concerned about the optics and the imagery,” McGurk said. “I encouraged the president to just shake his hand.” He later said: “We were asking some very hard things to the Saudis that we needed for our core interests, and so I think the fist bump set us back.”
By 2023, the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia were working toward a normalization agreement — a complicated deal that likely would have involved the U.S. offering Saudi Arabia a civil nuclear program and Israel agreeing to concessions around the Palestinian territories. The Oct. 7 attack derailed those talks. Biden often openly theorized that Hamas may have sought to prevent normalization.
McGurk said he “never saw anything to tie a direct connection,” but he didn’t rule it out. “Hamas, of course, does not recognize Israel, wants to destroy Israel, and I would not be surprised if one of the motivations on October 7th was to knock this agenda off the table,” he said, calling the prospect of Saudi-Israeli normalization “one of the biggest deals since the Cold War.”
President Trump has since revived the terms of that U.S.-Saudi arrangement, including the pledge to develop a civil nuclear program. However, the current Israeli government has refused to discuss a Palestinian state in the wake of the Oct. 7 attacks, and the civilian death toll in Gaza has made normalization politically harder for Saudi leaders.
McGurk’s memoir arrives at a time when the Middle East remains in turmoil, and his account offers a rare insider look at how close the United States came to a complete rupture with Israel — and what prevented it.
